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1. Introduction
The allocation of resources is an all-pervasive theme in economics.  And, I think it is no
exaggeration to say that the question of whether there exist mechanisms ensuring efficient allocation--
i.e., mechanisms that ensure that resources wind up in the hands of those who value them most--is of
central importance in the discipline.  Indeed, the very word “economics” connotes a preoccupation
with the issue of efficiency.
But economists’ interest in efficiency does not end with the question of existence.  If efficient
mechanisms can be constructed, we want to know what they look like and to what extent they might
resemble institutions used in practice.
Understandably, the question of what will constitute an efficient mechanism has been a major
concern of economic theorists going back to Adam Smith.  But the issue is far from just a theoretical
one.  It is also of considerable practical importance. This is particularly clear when it comes to
privatization, the transfer of assets from the state to the private sector.
In the last fifteen years or so, we have seen a remarkable flurry of privatizations in Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union, China, and highly industrialized Western nations such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.  An important justification for these transfers has been the
expectation that they will improve efficiency.  But if efficiency is the rationale, an obvious leading
question to ask is: “What sorts of transfer mechanisms will best advance this objective?”
One possible and, of course, familiar answer is “The Market.”  We know from the First
Theorem of Welfare Economics (see Debreu (1959)) that, under certain conditions, the competitive
mechanism (the uninhibited exchange and production of goods by buyers and sellers) results in an
efficient allocation.  A major constraint on the applicability of this result to the circumstances of
privatization, however, is the theorem’s hypothesis of large numbers.  For the competitive mechanism
to work properly--to avoid the exercise of monopoly power--there must be sufficiently many buyers2
and sellers so that no single agent has an appreciable effect on prices.  But privatization often entails
small numbers.  In the recent U.S. “spectrum” auctions--the auctions in which the government sold
rights (in the form of licenses) to use certain radio frequency bands for telecommunications--there
were often only two or three serious bidders for a given license.  The competitive model does not
seem readily applicable to such a setting.
An interesting alternative possibility was raised by William Vickrey forty years ago (Vickrey
(1961)).  Vickrey showed that, if a seller has a single indivisible good for sale, a second-price auction
(see Section 2) is an efficient mechanism—i.e., the winner is the buyer whose valuation of the good is
highest—in the case where buyers have private values (“private values” mean that no buyer’s private
information affects any other buyer’s valuation).  This finding is rendered even more significant by
the fact that it can readily be extended to the sale of multiple goods
1, as shown by Theodore Groves
(Groves (1973)) and Edward Clarke (Clarke (1971)).
Unfortunately, once the assumption of private values is dropped and thus buyers’ valuations
do depend on other buyers’ information (i.e., we are in the world of common
2 or interdependent
values), the second-price auction is no longer efficient, as I will illustrate by means of an example
below.  Yet, the common-values case is the norm in practice.  If, say, a telecommunications firm
undertakes a market survey to forecast demand for cell phones in a given region, the results of the
survey will surely be of interest to its competitors and thus turn the situation into one of common
values.
Recently, a literature has developed on the design of efficient auctions in common-values
settings.  The time is not yet ripe for a survey; the area is currently evolving too rapidly for that.  But I
would like to take this opportunity to discuss a few of the ideas from this literature.
                                                                
1 Vickrey himself also treated the case of multiple units of the same good.3
2.  The Basic Model
Because it is particularly simple, I will begin with the case of a single indivisible good.  Later
I will argue that much (but not all) of what holds in the one-good case extends to multiple goods.
Suppose that there are n potential buyers.  It will be simplest to assume that they are risk-
neutral (however, we can accommodate any other attitude toward risk if the model is specialized to
the case in which there is no residual uncertainty about valuations when all buyers’ information is
pooled).  Assume that each buyer i’s private information about the good can be summarized by a real-
valued signal.  That is, buyer i’s information is reduceable to a one-dimensional parameter.
3
Formally, suppose that each buyer i’s signal si lies in an interval  [ ] i i s s , .  The joint prior distribution
of ( ) n s s , , 1 K  is given by the c.d.f.  ( ). , , 1 n s s F K  Buyer i’s valuation for the good (i.e., the most he
would be willing to pay for it) is given by the function  ( ). , , 1 n i s s v K  I shall suppose (with little loss









Let us examine two illustrations of this model.
Example 1: Suppose that
( ) .   , , 1 i n i s s s v = L
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
2 I am using “common values” in the broad sense to cover any instance where one agent’s payoff depends on
another’s information.  The term is sometimes used narrowly to mean that all agents share the same payoff.
3 Later on I will examine the case of multidimensional signals.  As with multiple goods, much will
generalize.  As we will see, the most problematic case is that in which there are both multiple goods
and multidimensional signals.4
In this case, we are in the world of private values, not the interesting setting from the perspective of
this lecture, but a valid special case.
A more pertinent example is:
Example 2: Suppose that the true value of the good to buyer i is yi, which, in turn, is the sum of a
value component that is common to all buyers and a component that is peculiar to buyer i.  That is,
, i i z z y + =
where z  is the common component and zi is buyer i’s  idiosyncratic component.  Suppose, however,
that buyer i does not actually observe yi, but only a noisy signal
,   i i i y s e + = (2)
where ei is the noise term, and all the random variables-- z, the zi’s, and the ei’s--are independent.  In
this case every buyer j’s signal sj provides information to buyer i about  his valuation, because sj  is
correlated (via (2) ) with the common component z.  Hence we can express  ( ) n i s s v , , 1 K  as
( ) [ ],   , , | , , 1 1 n i n i s s y E s s v K K = (3)
where the right-hand side of (3) denotes the expectation of  yi conditional on the signals ( ) n s s , , 1 K .5
This second example might be kept in mind as representative of the sort of scenario that the analysis
is intended to apply to.
3.  Auctions
  An auction in the model of Section 2 is a mechanism (alternatively termed a “game form” or
“outcome function”) that, on the basis of the bids submitted, determines (i) who wins (i.e., who--if
anyone--is awarded the good), and (ii) how much each buyer pays
4.  Let us call an auction efficient
provided that, in equilibrium, buyer i is the winner if and only if
 
    ( ) ( ) n j
i j
n i s s v s s v , , max , , 1 1 K K
„
‡   (4)
 
  (this definition is slightly inaccurate because of the possibility of ties for highest valuation, an issue
that I shall ignore).  In other words, efficiency demands that, in an equilibrium of the auction, the
winner be the buyer with the highest valuation, conditional on all available information (i.e., on all
buyers’ signals).
  This notion of efficiency is sometimes called ex-post efficiency.  It assumes implicitly that
the social value of the good being sold equals the maximum of the potential buyers’ individual
valuations.  This assumption would be justified if, for example, each buyer used the good (e.g., a
spectrum license) to produce an output (e.g., telecommunication service) that is sold in a competitive
market without significant externalities (market power or externalities might drive a wedge between
individual and social values).
                                                                
4 For some purposes—e.g., dealing with risk-averse buyers (see Maskin and Riley (1984)) or liquidity
constraints (see Che and Gale (1996) or Maskin (2000) or allocative externalities (see Jehiel and Moldovanu
1998))—one must consider auctions in which buyers other than the winner also make payments.  In this lecture,
however, I will not have to deal with this possibility.6
  The reader may wonder why, even if one wants efficiency, it is necessary to insist that the
auction itself be efficient.  After all, the buyers could always retrade afterwards if the auction resulted
in a winner with less than the highest valuation.  The problem with relying on post-auction trade,
however, is much the same as that plaguing competitive exchange in the first place: these
mechanisms do not in general work efficiently when there are only a few traders.  To see this,
consider the following example
5:
 
  Example 3: Suppose that there are two buyers.  Assume that buyer 1 has won the auction and has a
valuation of 1.  If the auction is not guaranteed to be efficient, then there is some chance that buyer
2’s valuation is higher.  Suppose that, from buyer 1’s perspective, buyer 2’s valuation is distributed
uniformly in the interval [0,2].  Now, if there is to be further trade after the auction, someone has to
initiate it.  Let us assume that buyer 1 does so by proposing a trading price to buyer 2.  Presumably,
buyer 1 will propose a price p
* that maximizes his expected payoff, i.e., that solves
  ( )( ) 1 2
2
1
  max - - p p
p
 . (*)
  (To understand (*) note that  ( ) p - 2
2
1  is the probability that the proposal is accepted—since it is the
probability that buyer 2’s valuation is at least p—and that  p-1 is buyer 1’s net gain in the event of
acceptance.)  But the solution to (*) is  .  
2
3 * = p  Hence, if buyer 2’s valuation lies between 1 and  ,
2
3
the allocation, even after allowing for ex-post trade, will remain inefficient, since buyer 2 will reject
1’s proposal.
 
  I will first look at efficiency in the second-price auction.  This auction form (often called the
Vickrey auction) has the following rules: (i) each bidder i makes a (sealed) bid bi, which is a
                                                                
5 In this example, buyers have private values, but, as Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2000) show, resale7
nonnegative number; (ii) the winner is the bidder who has made the highest bid (again ignoring the
issue of ties); (iii) the winner pays the second-highest bid,  j
i j
b    max
„
.  As I have already noted and will
illustrate explicitly below, this auction can readily be extended to multiple goods.
  The Vickrey auction is efficient in the case of private values
6.  To see this, note first that it is
optimal--in fact, a dominant strategy--for buyer i to set bi =vi, i.e., to bid his true valuation. In
particular, bidding below vi does not affect buyer i’s payment if he wins (since his bid does not
depend on his own bid); it just reduces his chance of winning—and so is not a good strategy.  Bidding
above vi raises buyer i’s probability of winning, but the additional events in which he wins are
precisely those in which someone else has bid higher than vi.   In such events buyer i pays more than
vi, also not a desirable outcome.  Thus it is indeed optimal to bid bi =vi, which implies that the winner
is the buyer with the highest valuation, the criterion for efficiency.
  Unfortunately, the Vickrey auction does not remain efficient once we depart from private
values.  To see this, consider the following example.
 















3 3 2 1 3
3 1 2 3 2 1 2
3 2 1 3 2 1 1
s s s s v
s s s s s s v




  Notice that buyers 1 and 2 have common values, i.e., their valuations do not depend only on their own
signals.  Assume that it happens that s1 =s2=1 (of course, buyers 1 and 2 would not know that their
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
can become even more problematic when there are common values.
6 It is easy to show that the “first-price” auction—the auction in which each buyer makes a bid, the high bidder
wins, and the winner pays his bid—is a nonstarter as far as efficiency is concerned.  Indeed, even in the case of
private values, the first-price auction is never efficient except when buyers’ valuations are symmetrically
distributed (see Maskin (1992)).8
signal values are equal, since signals are private information), and suppose that buyer 3’s signal value
is either slightly below or slightly above 1.  In the former case, it is easy to see that
  , 3 2 1 v v v > >
  and so, for efficiency, buyer 1 ought to win.  However, in the latter case
  , 3 1 2 v v v > >
  and so buyer 2 is the efficient winner.  Thus the efficient allocation between buyers 1 and 2 turns on
whether s 3 is below or above 1.  But in a Vickrey auction, the bids made by buyers 1 and 2 cannot
incorporate information about s3 since that signal is private information to buyer 3.  Thus the outcome
of the auction cannot in general be efficient.
4.  An Efficient Auction
How should we respond to the shortcomings of the Vickrey auction as illustrated by Example 3?
One possible reaction is to appeal to classical mechanism-design theory.  Specifically, we could have
each buyer i announce a signal value  , ˆi s  award the good to the buyer i for whom  ( ) n i s s v ˆ , , ˆ1 K  is
highest, and choose the winner’s payment so as to evoke truth-telling in buyers, i.e., so as to induce
each buyer j to set  j s ˆ  equal to his true signal value  . j s
The problem with such a “direct revelation” mechanism is that it is utterly unworkable in
practice.  In particular, notice that it requires the mechanism designer to know the physical signal
spaces  , , , 1 n S S K   the functional forms  ( ) ￿ i v , and the prior distributions of the signals--an
extraordinarily demanding constraint.  Now, the mechanism designer could attempt to elicit this
information from the buyers themselves using the methods of the implementation literature (see
Palfrey (1993)).  For example, to learn the signal spaces, he could have each buyer announce a
vector( ) n S S ˆ , , ˆ
1 K and assign suitable penalties if the announcements did not match up appropriately.
A major difficulty with such a scheme, however, is that in all likelihood the signal spaces Si are
themselves private information. For analytic purposes, we model Si as simply an interval of numbers.9
But, this abstracts from the reality that buyer i’s signal corresponds to some physical entity--whatever
it is that buyer i observes.  Indeed, the signal may well be a sufficient statistic for data from a variety
of different informational sources. And there is no reason why other buyers should know just what
this array of sources is.
To avoid these complications, I shall concentrate on auction rules that do not make use of such
details as signal spaces, functional forms, and distributions.  Indeed, I will be interested in auctions
that work well irrespective of these details, that is, I will adhere to the “Wilson Doctrine” (after
Robert Wilson, who has been an eloquent proponent of the view that auction institutions should be
“detail-free”).  It turns out that a judicious modification of the Vickrey auction will do the trick.
Before turning to the modification, however, I need to introduce a restriction on valuation
functions that is critical to the possibility of constructing efficient auctions.  Let us assume that
( ), , ,   all   and     and     all for  1 n s s i j i K „



















7   (5)
In words, condition (5) says that buyer i’s signal has a greater marginal effect on his own valuation
than on that of any other buyer j (at least at points where buyer i’s and buyer j’s valuations are equal).
Notice that, in view of (1), condition (5)
8 is automatically satisfied by Example 1 (the case of
private values): the right-hand side of the inequality then simply vanishes.  Condition (5) also holds
for Example 2.  This is because, in that example, si conveys relevant information to buyer j(„i) about
the common component z but tells buyer i not only about z but also his idiosyncratic component zi.
Thus, vi will be more sensitive than vj to variations in si.
But whether or not condition (5) is likely to be satisfied, it is, in any event, e ssential for
efficiency.  To see what can go wrong without it, consider the following example.
                                                                
7 This condition was introduced by Gresik (1991).10
Example 5: Suppose that the owner of a tract of land wishes to sell off the rights to drill for oil on her
property.  There are two potential drillers who are competing for this right.  Driller 1’s fixed cost of
drilling is 1, whereas his marginal cost is 2.  In contrast, driller 2 has fixed and marginal cost of 2 and
1, respectively.  Assume that driller 1 observes how much oil is
underground.  That is, s1 equals the quantity of oil. Driller 2 obtains no private information.  Then if
the price of oil is 4 we have
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) . 2 3 2 1 4
1 2 1 2 4
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1
- = - - =
- = - - =
s s s v
s s s v
Observe that  ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 s v s v >  if and only if s1<1.  Thus, for efficiency, driller 1 should be awarded drilling
rights provided that  ,
2
1
(for      1
2
1
1 1 < < < s s  there is not enough oil to justify drilling at all).  Driller 2, by
contrast, should get the rights when s1 > 1.
In this example, there is no way (either through a modified Vickrey auction or otherwise) of
inducing driller 1 to reveal the true value s1 in order to allocate drilling rights efficiently.  To see this,
consider, without loss of generality, a direct revelation mechanism and let  ( ) 1 1 ˆ s t  be a monetary





1 1 s s ¢ ¢ < < ¢ < (6)
Then for driller 1 to have the incentive to announce truthfully when  , s     1 1 ¢ ¢ = s  we must have
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 s t s s t ¢ + - ¢ ¢ ‡ ¢ ¢ (7)
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
8 Notice that the strictness of the inequality in (5) rules out the case of “pure common values,” where all buyers
share the same valuation.  However, in that case, the issue of who wins does not matter for efficiency.11
(the left-hand side is his payoff when he is truthful, whereas the right-hand side is his payoff when he
pretends that  ). 1 1 s s ¢ =   Similarly, the incentive-constraint corresponding to  1 1 s s ¢ =  is
( ) ( ). 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 s t s t s ¢ ¢ ‡ ¢ + - ¢ (8)
Subtracting (8) from (7), we obtain
( ) , 0 2 1 1 ‡ ¢ ¢ - ¢ s s
a contradiction of (6).  Hence there exists no efficient mechanism.
The feature that interferes with efficiency in this example is the violation of condition (5),














< .  (9)
Inequalities (1) and (9) imply that, as s1 rises, drilling rights become more valuable to  driller 1 but
increasingly more likely, from the standpoint of efficiency, to be awarded to driller 2.  This conflict
makes the task of providing proper incentives for driller 1 impossible.
Assuming henceforth that (5) holds, let us  reconfront the task of designing an efficient
auction.  In Example 4 we saw that the Vickrey auction failed because buyers 1 and 2 could not
incorporate pertinent information about buyer 3 in their bids (since s3 was private information).  This
suggests that, as in  Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), a natural way of amending the Vickrey auction
would be to allow buyers to make contingent bids—bids that depend on other buyers’ valuations.  In
Example 4, this would enable buyer 1 to say, in effect, “I don’t know what buyer 3’s valuation is, but
if it turns out to be x, then I want to bid y.”
Let us examine how contingent bidding would work in the case of two buyers.  Buyer 1
would announce a schedule  (), ˆ
1 ￿ b  where, for all possible values v2,
( )   s 1' buyer  ˆ
2 1 = v b bid if buyer 2 has valuation v2.12
Similarly, buyer 2 would announce a schedule  ( ), ˆ
2 ￿ b  where
( ) = 1 2 ˆ v b buyer 2’s bid if buyer 1’s valuation is v1.
We would then look for a fixed point
( ) ( ) ) ( ˆ ), ( ˆ , 1 2 2 1 2 1
o o o o v b v b v v = , (10)
and 
install buyer 1 as the winner if  and only if   . 2 1
o o v v > (11)
To understand the rationale for (10) and (11), imagine that buyers bid  truthfully.  Since
signals are private information and thus buyer 1 will not in general know his own valuation, truthful
bidding means that, if his signal value is s1, he submits a schedule  ( ) () ￿ = ￿ 1 1 ˆ b b  such that
( ) 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1   all for    ) , ( ) , ( s s s v s s v b ¢ ¢ = ¢ .
9 (12)
That is, whatever  )   hence   (and   2 2 v s¢ turns out to be, buyer 1 bids his true valuation for that signal
value.  Similarly, truthful bidding for buyer 2 with signal value  s2  means reporting schedule
( ) () ￿ = ￿ 2 2 ˆ b b  such that
( ) .   all for    ) , ( ) , ( 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 s s s v s s v b ¢ ¢ = ¢ (13)
Observe that if buyers bid according to (12) and (13), then the true valuations
( ) ) , ( ), , ( 2 1 2 2 1 1 s s v s s v
constitute a fixed point in the sense of (10).
10
In view of (10) and (11), this means that if buyers are truthful, the auction will result in an
efficient allocation.  Thus, the remaining critical issue is how to get buyers to bid truthfully.  For this
                                                                
9 I noted in my arguments against direct revelation mechanisms that buyer 1 most likely will not know buyer 2’s
signal space S2.  But this in no way should prevent him from understanding how his own valuation is related to
that of buyer 2, which is what (12) is really expressing ( i.e., (12) still makes sense even if buyer 1 does not
know what values  2 s¢  can take).
10 Without further assumptions on valuation functions, there could be additional—non-truthful—fixed points.
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Eso and Maskin (2000a) provide conditions to rule such fixed points out.  But
even if they are not ruled out, the auction rules can be modified so that, in equilibrium, the truthful fixed point
results (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)).13
purpose, it is useful to recall the device that the Vickrey auction exploits to induce truthful bidding,
viz., to make the winner’s payment equal, not to his own bid, but to the lowest possible bid he could
have made and still have won the auction.
This trick cannot be exactly replicated in our setting because buyers are submitting schedules
rather than single bids.  But let us try to take it as far as it will go.  Suppose that when buyers repeat
the schedules  () ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ 2 1
ˆ , ˆ b b , the resulting fixed point  ( )
o o v v 2 1 ,  satisfies
. 2 1
o o v v >
Then according to our rules, buyer 1 should win.  But rather than having him pay v1
o, we will have
buyer 1 pay  , 1





1 ˆ v b v = . (14)
This payment rule, I maintain, is the common-values analog of the Vickrey trick in the sense that
*
1 v is the lowest constant bid (i.e., the lowest uncontingent bid) that buyer 1 could make and still win
(or tie for winning) given buyer 2’s bid  ( ). ˆ
2 ￿ b  The corresponding payment rule for buyer 2 should he
win is v2
* such that
( ).   ˆ *
2 1
*
2 v b v = (15)
I claim that, given the payment rules (14) and (15), it is an equilibrium for buyers to bid
















Let us suppose that buyer 2 is truthful, i.e., he bids b2(
.) satisfying (13).  I must show that it is optimal
for buyer 1 to bid  () ￿ 1 b  satisfying (12).
  Notice first that if buyer 1 wins, his payoff is






1 2 1 1   where , , v b v v s s v = - , (17)14
regardless of how he bids (since neither his valuation nor his payment depends on his bid).  I claim
that if buyer 1 bids truthfully, then he wins if and only if (17) is positive.  Observe that if this claim is
established, then I will in fact have shown that truthful bidding is optimal; because buyer 1’s bid does
not affect (17), the most he can possibly hope for is to win precisely in those cases where the net
payoff from winning is positive.
To see that the claim holds, let us first differentiate (13) with respect to  1 s¢ to obtain
























This identity, together with (1) and (16), implies that






But from (18), (17) is positive if and only if
( ) ( )( ) .   all for    ) , ( , 1
*
1 2 1 1 1
1
2 *
1 2 1 1 v v s s v v
dv
db
v s s v ¢ - ¢ > - (19)
Now, from the intermediate value theorem, there exists  )] , ( , [ 2 1 1
*
1 1 s s v v v ˛ ¢  such that
( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
1 2 1 1 1
1
2 *
1 2 2 1 1 2 ) , ( ) , ( v s s v v
dv
db
v b s s v b - ¢ = - .
Hence (17) is positive if and only if
( ) ( )
*
1 2 2 1 1 2
*
1 2 1 1 ) , ( ) , ( v b s s v b v s s v - > - , (20)




1 v b v = , is equivalent to
). , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 2 1 1 s s v s s v > (21)
Now suppose that buyer 1 is truthful. Because ( ) , ( ), , ( 2 1 2 2 1 1 s s v s s v ) is then a fixed point, 1 wins if
and only if (21) holds.  So we can conclude that, when buyer 1 is truthful, his net payoff from15
winning is positive (i.e., (17) is positive) if and only if he wins, which is what I claimed.  That is, the
modified Vickrey auction is efficient.
An attractive feature of the Vickrey auction in the case of private values is that bidding one’s
true valuation is optimal regardless of the behavior of other buyers, i.e., it is a dominant strategy.
Once we abandon private values, however, there is no hope of finding an efficient mechanism with
dominant strategies (this is because, if my payoff depends on your signal, then my optimal strategy
necessarily depends on the way that your strategy reflects your signal value, and so is not independent
of what you do). Nevertheless, equilibrium in our modified Vickery auction has a strong robustness
property.  In particular, notice that although, technically, truthful bidding constitutes only a Bayesian
(rather than dominant-strategy) equilibrium, equilibrium strategies are  independent of the prior
distribution of signals F.  That is, regardless of buyers’ prior beliefs about signals, they will behave
the same way in equilibrium.  In particular, this means that the modified Vickrey auction will be
efficient even in the case in which buyers’ signals are believed to be independent of one another.
11
One might complain that having a buyer make his bid a function of the other buyer’s
valuation imposes a heavy informational burden on him—what if he doesn’t know anything about the
connection between the other’s valuation and his own?  I would argue, however, that the modified
Vickrey auction should be viewed as giving buyers an additional opportunity rather than as setting an
onerous requirement.  After all, the degree to which a buyer makes his bid contingent is entirely up to
him.  In particular, he always has the option of bidding entirely uncontingently, i.e., of submitting a
constant function.  Thus, contingency is optional (but, of course, the degree to which the modified
Vickrey auction will be more efficient than the ordinary Vickrey will turn on the extent to which
buyers are prepared to bid contingently).
                                                                
11 Crémer and McLean (1988) exhibit a mechanism that attains efficiency if the joint distribution of signals is
common knowledge (including to the auction designer) and exhibits correlation.  In very recent work A.
Postlewaite has shown how this mechanism can be generalized to the case where the auction designer himself
does not know the joint distribution.16
I have explicitly illustrated how the modified Vickrey auction works only in the case of two
bidders, but the logic extends immediately to larger numbers.  For the case of n buyers the rules
become:
i)  each buyer i submits a contingent bid schedule  ), ( ˆ ￿ i b which is a function of v-i, the vector of
valuations excluding that of buyer i;







o v b v v v - = K  for all i;




i v v ‡  for all  i j „ ;






 where, for all  ). ( ˆ   satisfies      ,
* * *
j j j j v b v v i j - = „
  Under conditions (1) and (5), an argument similar to the two-buyer demonstration above establishes
that it is an equilibrium in this auction for each buyer to bid truthfully (see Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000))
12.  That is, if buyer i’s signal value is si, he should set  such that   ) ( ) ( ˆ ￿ = ￿ i i b b
  ( ) .   all for    ) , ( ) , ( i i i i i i i i s s s v s s v b - - - - ¢ ¢ = ¢
13 (22)
  Furthermore, it is easy to see that, if buyers bid truthfully, the auction results in an efficient allocation.
  One drawback of the modified Vickrey auction that I have exhibited is that a buyer must
report quite a bit of information (this is an issue distinct from that of the buyer’s having to  know a
great deal, discussed above)--a bid for each possible vector of valuations that others may have.  Perry
and Reny (1999a) have devised an alternative modification of the Vickrey auction that considerably
reduces the complexity of the buyer’s report.
                                                                
12 The reader may wonder whether, when  (5) is not satisfied and so an efficient auction may not be possible, the
efficiency of  the final outcome could be enhanced by allowing buyers to retrade after the auction is over.
However, any post-auction trading episode could alternatively be viewed as part of a single mechanism that
embraces both it and the auction proper.  That is, in our search for efficient auctions, we need not consider post-
auction trade since such activity could always be folded into the auction itself.  Indeed, permitting post-auction
trade can, in principle interfere with efficiency in the same way that renegotiation can interfere with the
efficiency of a contract (see Dewatripont (1989)).
13It is conceivable—although unlikely—that for a given vector v-i there could exist two different signal vectors
i i s s - - ¢ ¢ ¢   and    such that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i i i i i s s v s s v v s s v s s v - - - - - - - ¢ ¢ „ ¢ = ¢ ¢ = ¢ , , but    , , , in which case (22)
is not well defined.  To see how to handle that possibility see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000).17
  Specifically, the Perry-Reny auction consists of two rounds of bidding.  This means that a
buyer can make his second-round bid depend on whatever he learned about other buyers’ valuations
from their first-round bids, and so the auction avoids the need to report bid schedules. In the first
round, each buyer i submits a bid  . 0 ‡ i b  In the second round each buyer i submits a bid b
j
i  for each
buyer  . i j „  If some buyer submits a bid of zero in the first round, then the Vickrey rules apply: the
winner is the high bidder, and he pays the second-highest bid.  If all first-round bids are strictly
positive, then the second-round bids determine the outcome.  In particular, if there exists a buyer i
such that




i „ ‡   all for   
      (23)






  If there exists no i satisfying (23), then the good is allocated at
random.
  Perry and Reny show that, under assumption (1) and (5) and provided that the probability a
buyer has a zero valuation is zero, there exists an efficient equilibrium of this auction.  They also
demonstrate that the auction can be readily extended to the case in which multiple identical goods are
sold, provided that a buyer’s marginal utility from additional units is declining.
5.  The English Auction
The reader may wonder why, in my discussion of efficiency, I have not brought up
the English auction, the familiar open format in which (i) buyers call out bids publicly (with the
proviso that each successive bid exceed the one before), (ii) the winner is the last buyer to make a bid,
and (iii) the winner pays his bid.  After all, the opportunity to observe other buyers’ bids in the
English auction would seem to allow a buyer to make a conditional bid in the same way that the
modified Vickrey auction does.
However, as shown in Maskin (1992),  Eso and Maskin (2000b) and Krishna (2000), the
English auction is not efficient in as wide a class of cases as the modified Vickrey auction. To see18
this, let us consider a variant of the English auction, sometimes called the “Japanese” auction (see
Milgrom and Weber (1982)), which is particularly convenient analytically:
( i) all buyers are initially in the auction;
(ii) the auctioneer raises the price continuously starting from zero;
(iii) a buyer can drop out (publicly) at any time;
( iv) the last buyer remaining wins;
(v) the winner pays the price prevailing when the penultimate buyer dropped out.
Now, in this auction, a buyer can indeed condition his drop-out point according to when other buyers
have dropped out, allowing bids in effect to be conditional on other buyers’ valuations.  However, a
buyer can condition only on buyers who have already dropped out.  Thus, for efficiency, buyers must
drop out in the “right” order in the equilibrium.  That this might not happen is illustrated by the
following example from Eso and Maskin (2000a):
Example 6: Suppose there are two buyers, where
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 ) , ( s s s s v - + =
and
  1 2 2 1 21 2 2 ) , ( s s s s v - + =
and s1 and s2 are distributed uniformly on [0,1].  Notice first that conditions (1) and (5) hold, so that
the modified Vickrey auction results in a efficient equilibrium allocation.  Indeed, buyers’ equilibrium
contingent bids are
( ) 2 1 2 1 2 3 6 v s v b - - =
and
( ) 1 2 1 2 2 3 6 v s v b - - = .
Now, consider the English auction.  For i=1,2 let pi(si) be the price at which buyer i drops out if his
signal value is si.  If the English auction were efficient, then we would have19
s1>s2 if and only if  ( ) ( )      . 2 2 1 1 s p s p > (w)
Hence,
( ) ( )     then  ,   if 2 2 1 1 2 1 s p s p s s s = = = (ww)
But from (w) and (ww), pi(s+)s) > pi (s) and so
() ￿ i p  is strictly increasing in si.  (www)
Thus,
( ) ( ) s s v s p , 1 1 =
and
( ) ( ) s s v s p , 2 2 =
(if   ( ) ( ) s p s s v 1 1 , > , then buyer 1 drops out before the price reaches his valuation and so would do
better to stay in a bit longer; if  ( ) ( ) s p s s v 1 1 , < , then buyer 1 stays in for prices above his valuation,
and so would do better to drop out earlier).  But,
( ) s s s s s v - = - + = 2 2 2 , 1 ,
which is decreasing in s, violating our finding that p1(A) is increasing.  In short, efficiency demands
that a buyer with a lower signal value drop out first.  But if buyer i’s signal value is s, he has the
incentive to drop out when the price equals  ( ) s s v , 1 , and this function is decreasing in  s. So, in
equilibrium buyers will not drop out in the right order.  We conclude that the English auction does not
have an efficient equilibrium in this example.
In Example 6 each buyer’s valuation is decreasing in the other buyer’s signal.  Indeed, this
feature is important: as Maskin (1992) shows, the English auction is efficient in the case n=2 when
valuations are nondecreasing functions of signals (and conditions (1) and (5) hold).  However,
examples due to Perry and Reny (1999b), Krishna (2000), and Eso and Maskin (2000b) demonstrate
that this result does not extend to more than two buyers.  Nevertheless, Krishna (2000) provides some20
interesting conditions (considerably stronger than the juxtaposition of (1) and (5)) under which the
English auction is efficient with three or more buyers (see also Eso and Maskin (2000b)).  Moreover,
the Perry and Reny paper shows that the English auction can be modified (in a way analogous to their
(1999b) alteration of the Vickrey auction) that renders it efficient under the same conditions as the
modified Vickrey auction.  In fact, this modified English auction extends to multiple (identical) units,
as long as buyers’ marginal valuations are decreasing in the number of units consumed (in the
multiunit case, the Perry-Reny auction is actually a modification of the Ausubel (1997) generalization
of the English auction).
  6.  Multiple Goods
  In the same way that the ordinary Vickrey auction extends to multiple goods via the Groves-
Clarke mechanism, so our modified Vickrey auction can be extended to handle more than one good.
It is simplest to consider the case of two buyers, 1 and 2, and two goods, A and B.  If there were
private values, the pertinent information about buyer  i would consist of three numbers,
iAB iB iA v v v   and   , , --his valuations, respectively, for good A, good B, and and both goods together.
  Efficiency would then mean allocating the goods to maximize the sum of valuations.  For example, it
would be efficient to allocate both goods to buyer 1 provided that
  { }. , , max 2 2 1 2 1A 1 AB A B B AB v v v v v v + + ‡
  The Groves-Clarke mechanism is the natural generalization of the Vickrey auction to a multi-
good setting.  In this mechanism, buyers submit valuations (in our two-good, private-values model,
each buyer i submits  iAB iB iA v v v ˆ   and   , ˆ , ˆ ); the goods are allocated in the way that maximizes the sum
of the submitted valuations; and each buyer makes a payment equal to his marginal impact on the
other buyers (as measured by their submitted valuations).  Thus, in the private-values model, if buyer
1 is allocated good A, then he should pay
  , ˆ ˆ 2 2 B AB v v -     (24)21
  since  AB v2 ˆ  would be buyer 2’s payoff were buyer 1 absent,  B v2 ˆ  is his payoff given buyer 1’s
presence, and so the difference between the two—i.e., (24)-- is buyer 1’s marginal effect on buyer 2.
  Given private values, bidding one’s true valuation is a dominant strategy in the Vickrey
auction and the same is true in the Groves-Clarke mechanism. Hence, in view of its allocative rule,
the mechanism is efficient in the case of private values.  But, as with the Vickrey auction, the Groves-
Clarke mechanism is not efficient when there are common values.  Hence, I shall examine a
modification of Groves-Clarke analogous to that for Vickrey.
  As in the one-good case, assume that each buyer  i ( i=1,2) observes a private real-valued
signal si. Buyer i’s valuations are functions of the two signals:  
    ). , ( ), , (   ), , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 s s v s s v s s v iAB iB iA
  The appropriate counterpart to condition (1) is the requirement that if H and  H¢ are two bundles of
goods for which, given  ( ), , 2 1 s s buyer i prefers H, then the intensity of that preference rises with  . i s
That is, for all i=1,2 and for any two bundles  AB B A H H , , , , f = ¢
  ( ) 0 ) , ( ) , ( 0 ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 > -
¶
¶
￿ > - ¢ ¢ s s v s s v
s
s s v s s v H i iH
i
H i iH . (25) 
 
  Notice that if, in particular,  ,   and   f = ¢ = H A H  then (25) just reduces to the requirement that if







iA  i.e., to (1).
  Similarly, the proper generalization of (5) is the requirement that if, for given signal values, two
allocations of goods are equally efficient (i.e., give rise to the same sum of valuations), then an
increase in si leads the allocation that buyer i prefers to become the more efficient. That is, for all
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s s v s s v s s v s s v
(26)
  Notice that, if just one good A were being allocated and the two allocations were
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,   and   , , 2 1 2 1 A H H A H H f f = ¢ ¢ =  then, when  i=1, condition (26) would reduce to the
requirement
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  which is just (5).
  An auction is efficient in this setting if, for all  ), , ( 2 1 s s the equilibrium allocation  ( )
o o H H 2 1 ,
solves
 ( )











  Under assumptions (25) and (26), the following rules constitute an efficient auction:
  ( i) buyer i submits schedules ), ( ˆ ), ( ˆ ), ( ˆ ￿ ￿ ￿ iAB iB iA b b b  where for all H=A,B,AB and all vj
  ( )
( );   , ,   are   luations         va           
) (   ' buyer    if   for    bid   ' buyer    ˆ
jAB jB jA j
j iH
v v v v




  (ii) the auctioneer computes a fixed point ( )
o o v v 2 1 ,  such that, for all i and H,




iH v b v ˆ =   ;
 
   (iii) goods are divided according to allocation ( ), , 2 1
o o H H  where23
 ( )
( )











i v H H
  (iv) suppose that buyer 1 is allocated good A (i.e.,  A H
o = 1 ); if  (a) there exists 
*
1 v  such that





1 v b v b v AB B A = +   (28)
  then buyer 1 pays
  ( ) ( );   ˆ ˆ *
1 2
*
1 2 v b v b B AB - (29)








1   and   )   ˆ (with    ˆ v v v v A <  such that








1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v v b v A B B A + = +
  and






1 ˆ ˆ v b v b v AB A B = + ,
  then buyer 1 pays







1 2 v b v b v b v b A AB B A - + - (30)
 
(v) if buyer 1 is allocated good B, then his payment is completely analogous to that  of (iv);
(vi) if buyer 1 is allocated goods A and B, then see the Appendix for his payment;
(vii) buyer 2’s payments are completely analogous to those of buyer 1.
Rules (i)-(iii) so closely mirror rules (i)-(iii) of the modified Vickrey auction in section 4 that
they do not require further comment.  Let us, therefore, focus on rule (iv).  If A were the only good
being allocated, then to compute buyer 1’s payment, we would reduce 
o
A A v v 1 1   from    to the point 
*
1A v
where it is no longer uniquely efficient to allocate buyer 1 good A (i.e., it becomes equally efficient to
allocate A to buyer 2) and have him pay his marginal impact at 
*
1 v  on buyer 2: the difference between
buyer 2’s payoff from getting A and that from getting nothing:
( ) ( )
* * = - A A A A v b v b 1 2 1 2 ˆ 0 ˆ ,24
which is payment rule (14).  Using this same principle in the two-good setting, let us reduce
o
A A v v 1 1   from    to the first point where it is no longer uniquely efficient to allocate A to buyer 1 and B
to buyer 2.  There are two possible cases.  In case (a), at this first switching point it becomes efficient
to allocate both goods to buyer 2. Let us denote the switching point in this case by 
*
1A v  (choose
*
AB B v v 1
*
1   and    to conform with 
*
1A v , i.e., choose them so that  ( )
* * * * = AB B A v v v v 1 1 1 1 , ,  lies in the domain
of  () () () ( )).   ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
2 2 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ AB B A b b b  Hence, at 
*
1A v , buyer 1’s marginal impact on buyer 2 is the difference
between 2’s payoff from getting both goods,  ( )
*
1 2 ˆ v b AB , and that from getting just B,  ( ), ˆ *
1 2 v b B  i.e.,
(29).  In case (b) it becomes efficient at the first switching point 
*
A v1 ˆ  (choose 
* *
AB B v v 1 1 ˆ   and   ˆ to
conform with 
*
A v1 ˆ ) to allocate A to buyer 2 but B to buyer 1.  Hence, at 
*
1 ˆ A v  buyer 1’s marginal
impact on buyer 2 from being allocated A rather than B is the difference between buyer 2’s payoff
from A and that from B:




1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v b B A - .   (31)
But (31) does not represent buyer 1’s full marginal impact on buyer 2 because it compares buyer 2’s
payoff from B with that from good A, rather than from both A and B.  To obtain the latter comparison,
reduce 
*
B B v v 1 1 ˆ   from    to the point 
* *
1B v  where it just becomes efficient to allocate both A and B to
buyer 2.  The marginal impact on buyer 2 at 
* *
1B v  (choose 
* * * *
AB A v v 1 1   and    to conform with 
* *
B v1 ) is
( ) ( ).   ˆ ˆ * *
1 2
* *
1 2 v b v b A AB -   (32)
Adding (31) and (32), we obtain buyer 1’s full marginal impact on buyer 2, viz., (30).  Notice that in
the case of private values, where  ( ) ( ),   ˆ ˆ ˆ *
1 2
* *
1 2 v b v b A A = (30) reduces to  , ˆ ˆ
2 2 B AB b b -  which is buyer 1’s
payment for good A in the ordinary Groves-Clarke mechanism.25
It can be shown (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)) that it is an equilibrium for buyers to bid
truthfully in the above auction, i.e., for each i and bundle of goods     , , , AB B A H = buyer i should set
), ( ) ( ˆ ￿ = ￿ iH iH b b  where
( ) j j i iH j i jH iH s s s v s s v b ¢ ¢ = ¢   all for    ) , ( ) , (
if buyer i’s signal value is si.  Notice that if, in fact, buyers are truthful, the auction results in an
efficient equilibrium.
7.  Multidimensional Signals
Up until now, the results I have quoted on efficient auctions with common values have
assumed that buyers’ signals are one-dimensional.  This is for good reason—the results are simply not
true otherwise.  Indeed, with multidimensional signals, efficiency in the sense I have defined it is
generally unattainable with any mechanism (a point found in Maskin (1992) and Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1998)). To see this, consider the following example:
Example 7: Suppose that there are two buyers and one good.  Assume that buyer 2’s signal s2 is, as
usual, one-dimensional but that buyer 1’s signal s1 has two components:  s1=(s11,s12).
Let
( ) 2 12 11 2 12 11 1 , , s s s s s s v a + + =
and
( ) .   , , 12 11 2 2 12 11 2 s s s s s s v g b + + =
Because of independence, buyer 1’s objective function is the same for any pairs (s11, s12) that add up
to the same constant, and thus, he will behave the same way for any such pairs.  In particular, if
( ) 12 11,s s ¢ ¢  and  ( ) 12 11,s s ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢  are pairs such that  12 11 12 11 s s s s ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ = ¢ + ¢ , then, in any auction, the26
equilibrium outcome must be identical for the two pairs.  But, unless b=g, the efficient allocation may
turn on which pair obtains—specifically, given s2, we might have
12 11 2 2 12 11 s s s s s s ¢ + ¢ + > + ¢ + ¢ g b a (33)
but
,   12 11 2 2 2 1 s s s s s s ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ + < + ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ g b a (34)
so that, with  ( ) ( ) 12 11 12 11 , , s s s s ¢ ¢ = , the good should be allocated to buyer 1 and, with
( ) ( ),   , , 12 11 12 11 s s s s ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ =  it should be allocated to buyer 2 (if b=g, this conflict does not arise; the
inequality signs in (33) and (34) must be the same).  Hence, an efficient auction is impossible when
b„g.
However, since buyer 1 cares only about the sum  ,   12 11 s s +  it is natural to define
12 11 1 s s r + =
and set
( ) 2 1 2 1 1 , s r s r w a + =
and
( ) [ ] 1 12 11 12 11 2 12 , 11 2 1 2 | , r s s s s s E s r w s s = + + + = g b .
Notice that we have reduced the two-dimensional signal  s1 to the one-dimensional signal  r1.
Furthermore, provided that a,b, and g are all less than 1 (so that condition (5) holds), our modified
Vickrey auction  is efficient with respect to the “reduced” valuation functions
() ()    and   2 1 ￿ ￿ w w (because all the analysis of Section 4 applies).  Hence, a moment’s reflection should
convince the reader that, although full efficiency is impossible for the  valuation functions
( ) (),     and   2 1 ￿ ￿ v v  the modified Vickrey auction is constrained efficient, where “constrained” refers to
the requirement that buyer 1 must behave the same way for any pair ( ) 12 11,s s  summing to the same
r1 (in the terminology of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), the auction is “incentive efficient”).27
Unfortunately, as Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) show in their important paper, this trick of
reducing a multidimensional signal to one dimension no longer works in general if there are multiple
goods. To see the problem suppose that, as in Section 5, there are two goods A and B, but that now a
buyer i ( i=1,2,3) receives two signals—one for each good.  Specifically, let s1A and s1B be buyer i’s
signals for A and B, respectively, and let his valuation functions be
( ) ( ).   , ,   and   , , 3 2 1 3 2 1 B B B iB A A A iA s s s v s s s v
Let us first fix the signal values of buyers 2 and 3 at levels such that, as we vary s1A and s1B,
either (i) it is efficient to allocate good A to buyer 1 and B to 2, or (ii) it is efficient to allocate good A
to 2 and B to 3.  In case (i), we have
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),   , , , , , , , , 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 B B B B A A A A B B B B A A A A s s s v s s s v s s s v s s s v + > +
that is,
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) B B B B B B B B A A A A
A A A A
s s s v s s s v s s s v
s s s v
3 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 2
3 2 1 1





whereas in case (ii) we have
( )
( ) ( ) ( ).   , , , , , ,                              
, ,
3 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 2
3 2 1 1
B B B B B B B B A A A A
A A A A
s s s v s s s v s s s v




Notice that buyer 1’s objective function does not depend on s1B (s1B affects only buyer 1’s valuation
for good B, but buyer 1 is not allocated B in either case (i) or (ii)).  Hence, the equilibrium outcome of
any auction cannot turn on the value of this parameter.  But this means that, if an auction is efficient,
which of case (i) or (ii), (i.e., which of (35) or (36)) holds cannot depend on s1B.  We conclude, from
the right-hand sides of  (35) and (36), that  
( ) ( ) B B B B B B B B s s s v s s s v 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 , , , , -
must be independent of s1B.  Expressed differently, we have
( ) ( ) B B B B
B
B B B B
B
s s s v
s
s s s v
s
3 2 1 2
1
3 2 1 3
1







Repeating the argument for all other pairs of buyers and for good B, we have















Next, let us fix the signal values of buyers 2 and 3 at levels such that, as we vary s1A and s1B,
either (iii) it is efficient to allocate A to buyer 1 and B to 2; or (iv) it is efficient to allocate B to buyer
1 and A to 2.  In case (iii), we have
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),   , , , ,                              
, , , ,
3 2 1 2 3 2 1 1
3 2 1 2 3 2 1 1
A A A A B B B B
B B B B A A A A
s s s v s s s v




and in case (iv),
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).   , , , ,                               
, , , ,
3 2 1 2 3 2 1 1
3 2 1 2 3 2 1 1
A A A A B B B B
B B B B A A A A
s s s v s s s v




To simplify matters, let us assume that valuation functions are linear:
( ) A A A A A A A s s s s s s v 3 13 2 12 1 3 2 1 1 , , a a + + = (40)
( ) B B B B B B B s s s s s s v 3 13 2 12 1 3 2 1 1 , , b b + + = (41)
and similarly for buyers 2 and 3.  Then (38) and (39) can be rewritten as
B B B A A A B A s s s s s s s s 3 23 2 22 1 21 3 23 2 22 1 21 1 1 b b b a a a - - - + + > - (42)
and
B B B A A A B A s s s s s s s s 3 23 2 22 1 21 3 23 2 22 1 21 1 1 b b b a a a - - - + + < - . (43)
Now (because we have fixed 2’s and 3’s signal values), buyer 1’s objective function depends only on
s1A –s1B.  That is, for any value of ), buyer 1 will behave the same way for signal values (s1A, s 1B) as
for ( ) D + D + B A s s 1 1 , .  Hence, in any auction, the equilibrium outcome must be the same for any
value of D.  In particular, if the auction is efficient, whether (42) or (43) applies cannot depend on D’s


































  and     all for    . (44)
The necessary conditions (37) and (44), due to Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998), are certainly
restrictive.  Nevertheless, as shown in Eso and Maskin (2000a), there is a natural class of cases in
which they are automatically satisfied.  Specifically, suppose that in our two-good model, each buyer
wants at most one good (this is not essential).  Assume that the true value of good A to buyer i, yiA, is
the sum of a component zA common to all buyers and a component of ziA that is idiosyncratic to him.
That is,
iA A iA z z y + =  .
Similarly, assume that buyer i’s true valuation of good B, yiB, satisfies
iB B iB z z y + = .
Suppose, however, that buyer i does not directly observe his true valuations but only noisy signals of
them.  That is, he observes siA and siB, where
iA iA iA y s e + =
and
iB iB iB y s e + = .
It can be shown (see  Eso and Maskin (2000a)) that if the random variables zH, ziH,giH, i=1,2,3,
H=A,B, are independent, normal random variables and if the variances of giH and ziH are proportional
to that of zH, i.e., for all i, there exists kig and kiz such that
B A H z k z z k H iz iH H i iH ,    , var  var   and   var  var = = = e e ,
then (37) and (44) are automatically satisfied and the modified Groves-Clarke mechanism discussed
in Section 6 is an efficient auction.
8.  Further Work30
There is clearly a great deal of work remaining to be done on efficient auctions, including
dealing with the multiple good/multidimensional problem in cases where (37) and (44) do not hold.  I
would like to simply underscore one issue: finding an open auction counterpart to the modified
Groves-Clarke mechanism in the case of multiple goods.  The task of submitting contingent bids is
considerable even for a single good.  For multiple goods, it could be formidable.  For this reason, as I
have already discussed, researchers have sought open auctions –variants of the English auction—as
desirable alternatives.  Perry and Reny (1999b) have exhibited a lovely modification of the Ausubel
(1997) auction (which in turn elegantly extends the English auction to multiple identical goods).
However, efficiency in that auction obtains only when all goods are identical and buyers’ marginal
valuations are declining.  It would be an important step, in my judgment, to find a similar result
without such restrictions on goods or preferences.31
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Appendix: Buyer 1’s payment when allocated both goods in a two-good, two-buyer auction.
If
(a) there exists 
*
1 v  such that
( )
* * = 1 2 1 ˆ v b v AB AB ,
then buyer 1 pays
( )
*
1 2 ˆ v b AB ;
if (a) does not hold and instead
(b) there exists 
*
1 ˆ v such that
( )
* * * + = 1 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v v B A AB ,
then if,
     (b1) there exists  such that   1
* * v
( ) ( )
* * * * * * = + 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ   v b v b v AB B A ,
buyer 1 pays
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * - + 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v b v b B AB B ;
and if instead
     (b2) there exist 
* * * * *
1 1 v ˆ   and   ˆ v  such that
( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * + = + 1 2 1 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v v b v A B B A
and
( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * * = + 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ v b v b v AB A B ,
then buyer 1 pays
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * * * * - + - + 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v b v b v b v b A AB B A B ;
finally, if34
(c) there exists  such that   ˆ ˆ1
* v
( )
* * * + = 1 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ   v b v v A B AB
then if
     (c1) there exists  such that 1
* * v
( ) ( )
* * * * * * = + 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ   v b v b v AB A B ,
buyer 1 pays
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * * - + 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v b v b A AB A ;
and if instead
     (c2) there exist 
* * * * *
1 1 v ˆ   and   ˆ ˆ v  such that
  ( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * + = + 1 2 1 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v v b v B A A B
and
( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * * = + 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ v b v b v AB B A ,
then buyer 1 pays
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * * * * - + - + 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ v b v b v b v b v b B AB A B A .